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Abstract  8 
There is a paucity of empirical insights on how existing policies in disaster recovery and water, 9 
sanitation and hygiene (WASH) play out during disaster recovery in the Global South. This 10 
paper addresses this critical gap using the case study of 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha. The 11 
data was collected through participatory and learning action tools and semi-structured 12 
interviews with key informants. This study found pervasive exclusion of women and local 13 
actors from recovery decision-making. The policies and guidance at national and subnational 14 
level lacked clear emphases on roles and responsibilities of the local governments, and did 15 
not emphasise their role in setting recovery objectives and priorities. We conclude that 16 
existing policies should emphasise immediate as well as longer-term WASH needs, adopt a 17 
multi-hazard perspective in preparedness and WASH policies, and feature WASH during 18 
recovery in the existing manuals, policies and programmes.  19 
 20 
Keywords: policy analysis, disaster recovery, water, sanitation and hygiene 21 
Total words: 7484 22 
1. Introduction 23 
Strengthening of national and local capacities for disaster risk management is a foundational 24 
theme within the movement toward disaster risk reduction, articulated strongly within the 25 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015). The strategic push 26 
in disaster recovery has leaned towards heavy reliance on top-down government-centric 27 
solutions and capacity enhancement of state political and administrative capacities and 28 
resources (Oxley, 2013). Yet, the practical aspects, the “how-to” engage and empower local 29 
actors and empower women, are areas that humanitarian agencies continue to struggle while 30 
designing recovery plans.  31 
 32 
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The impact of disasters on progress of water supply, sanitation development, subsequent 33 
policy revisions and role of local actors during recovery is an under-researched area. The role 34 
of local actors, including the position of women and other vulnerable groups during recovery, 35 
is an issue under-exposed in literature. This paper provides an on-the-ground assessment of 36 
this phenomenon, which is a potentially valuable contribution to the literature. It elaborates 37 
on how local actors, including local governments, engage and lead disaster recovery 38 
operations, and participate in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programmes. It also 39 
investigates women’s roles during recovery, and their participation in WASH during recovery. 40 
This article addresses this knowledge gap on how such relevant policies play out in on the 41 
ground processes of disaster recovery using empirical evidence. The aim of this research is to 42 
contribute to insights about effective disaster recovery in the global South by undertaking a 43 
case study research of disaster recovery in Odisha, India. 44 
 The article asks, “How do existing policies in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and 45 
disaster management enable local actors and women to take action during recovery? 46 
Furthermore, how can these policies be strengthened and translated into practice effectively?”  47 
This paper will explore approaches that include local actors, organisations and women in 48 
sustaining WASH behaviour change using a case study from 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha, 49 
India. Cyclone Phailin and subsequent floods in 2013 had affected 12 million people directly 50 
or indirectly (Dash, 2013). To achieve the research aim, the following steps were taken: a) 51 
developing a guiding analytical framework through review of literature; b) undertaking a case 52 
study of 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha using mixed methods and c) analysing and discussing 53 
empirical findings in light of existing policies and drawing conclusions for wider implications. 54 
 55 
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2. Background and context 56 
This section reviews two bodies of literature – disaster recovery studies and on post-disaster 57 
WASH – to provide analytical guidance for the empirical research.  58 
The current structure of the humanitarian aid system has few incentives for engaging local 59 
actors and organisations. Instead the humanitarian sector’s power dynamics, culture, 60 
financing and incentive structures create compelling reasons to remain closed and centralised 61 
and averse to innovation, learning and transformation (Bennett, 2016). Spiegel (2017) calls 62 
for a major revision of humanitarian leadership and coordination of humanitarian 63 
emergencies, aiming for “minimal, efficient, and context-specific coordination, with fewer 64 
processes and meetings, that leads to differentiated and effective responses and saves lives” 65 
(p.17).  There have been numerous studies evaluating government-NGO coordination, NGO-66 
NGO coordination, cluster approaches and consortia models for coordination (Clarke & 67 
Campbell, 2018; Krishnan, 2017; Raju & Becker, 2013). During recovery from the Indian Ocean 68 
Tsunami, engaging local actors was found to be challenging and time consuming, yet vital for 69 
removing the confusion stemming from the rush of aid organizations – not least international 70 
NGOs – to the affected areas, stepping on each other’s toes with lack of coordination 71 
(Christoplos, 2006; Telford et al., 2006). Research from Pakistan shows how incentivizing from 72 
donor organisations has led to break-down of community-driven action because cultural 73 
expectations that the community will have near-exclusive local control over decision-making 74 
and resource allocation are weighted against top-down decisions over distribution and 75 
entitlement, thereby eroding the legitimacy and accountability of local organisations (Bano, 76 
2012). 77 
 78 
Globally, studies have highlighted the role of local actors and social networks in the recovery 79 
process as either an enabling aspect or reinforcing barriers to vulnerable groups (Aldrich, 80 
2011; Rahill et al., 2014). Twigg & Mosel (2017) draw attention towards emergence – 81 
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spontaneous responses by self-organising, voluntary groups and individuals – who undertake 82 
search and rescue, transport and distribute relief supplies, and provide food and drink to 83 
victims and emergency workers. These emergent groups form part of the social capital, and 84 
have a large role to play during recovery. In coastal Andhra Pradesh, Bosher (2005) found 85 
that  the ‘lower’ castes being the most marginalised, powerless and poorest members 86 
attempted to address their marginalisation by accessing socio-economic resources such as 87 
social networks – civil society institutions such as NGOs, CBOs and informal kinship networks 88 
– to increase their resilience to frequent small-scale crises. In coastal West Bengal, local 89 
networks along with community leaders and local administration played an important role in 90 
reducing risk during and after cyclones, and played a larger role in social reconstruction 91 
processes (Misra et al., 2017). After cyclone Aila in 2009, youth club members, women’s self-92 
help groups (SHGs), farmers’ cooperatives, fishermen groups, and other business 93 
cooperatives consisting of shop owners and businessmen provided common networks, thus 94 
enhancing the social capital (Sanyal & Routray, 2016).  95 
 96 
Women are often categorised as individuals vulnerable to disasters (McEntire, 2012), 97 
although evidence from post-tsunami Eastern Sri Lanka indicates that pre-existing gender 98 
relationships, entitlements, networks with local NGOs, and relationships with local authorities 99 
distributing post-disaster aid have positively influenced gendered recovery (Thurnheer, 2009). 100 
Sanyal and Routray (2016) found that women, acting as part of self–help groups (SHGs), were 101 
instrumental in empowering each other, bringing other women in the community closer, 102 
aiding cash flow with bank linkages and internal lending, as well as information flow through 103 
their networks. A study examining the outcomes of community-led approaches in post-104 
tsunami Aceh found that livelihood interventions needed to fit with clearly identifiable local 105 
networks, structures and practices if they hoped to succeed, as projects that did not build on 106 
local networks tended to fall over when the NGO staff withdrew (McCarthy, 2014). Sultana 107 
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(2010) draws from an analysis in Bangladesh of the gendered dynamics of floods and disasters, 108 
as well as of interventions, to demonstrate the differential and gendered implications of both 109 
water-related hazards and the structural interventions that were envisioned to address the 110 
hazards. Using evidence from multiple disasters that affect Odisha, Ray-Bennett (2009b) 111 
found that women demonstrated their individual and collective agencies in order to meet 112 
their cultural and biological needs under severe crisis. The idea and practice of women’s 113 
empowerment in the Indian context, has degenerated into a set of largely apolitical, 114 
technocratic, and narrow interventions that create nothing like the radical transformation 115 
envisaged by early women’s movement leaders (Batliwala, 2007). Challenging the specific 116 
gendered meaning, Batliwala (2007) proposes women’s empowerment as the transformation 117 
of the relations of power between men and women, within and across social categories of 118 
various kinds.  119 
 120 
Despite operational efforts, the evidence of roles played by local actors and networks for 121 
effective WASH behaviour change during recovery is scant. It is important to assess the extent 122 
to which existing policies cater to the contextual and programming challenges of recovery, 123 
including demographic changes, returning populations, integration of displaced communities 124 
with host communities and resettlement to safer locations (Wisner & Adams, 2002). We refer 125 
to the “humanitarian aid system”, which includes donor organizations like UK AID and the 126 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Department (ECHO); 127 
international NGOs like Oxfam, Christian Aid and Save the Children; national government 128 
agencies like Public Health Engineering, Water Resources, Sanitation, Rural Development, 129 
Revenue and Disaster Management, Land Resettlement and Rehabilitation that are involved 130 
in different aspects of water, sanitation and disaster management; subnational NGOs like 131 
Society for Leprosy Amelioration & Rehabilitation (SOLAR) in Puri, United Artists’ Association 132 
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(UAA) in Ganjam and UNNAYAN in Balasore. The consortium approach in Odisha, and 133 
challenges with inter-agency coordination, have been described elsewhere (Krishnan, 2017).   134 
3. Methods 135 
3.1 Sampling strategy 136 
Oxfam’s Cyclone Phailin and flood response in Odisha was used to gain a critical perspective 137 
on the differences in WASH practices and recovery processes across different villages, and the 138 
impact of agency support on recovery. Government’s programmes and policies in Odisha were 139 
analysed in light of empirical findings from Puri and Balasore districts, which were affected by 140 
cyclone and floods respectively during the cyclone (See Figure 1). 141 
 8 
 142 
Figure 1: Study map of districts affected by Cyclone Phailin and floods in 2013 – Puri, Ganjam and Balasore, which 143 
were also Oxfam’s intervention areas 144 
 145 
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Data was collected from 13 villages – 8 from Puri and 5 from Balasore, where Oxfam had 146 
intervened. One of the villages in Balasore – Chandanamkhana – was also affected by erosion, 147 
as the river washed away the homestead land and farmland in the village. Data collection in 148 
these villages reflected the changing dynamics in the response programme, and responded to 149 
the emerging community needs. It followed an iterative and inductive approach. 150 
3.2 Data collection tools and analysis 151 
The first author worked in Puri from October 2013 – March 2014 with Oxfam and visited 152 
Balasore in March 2014, 6 months after floods had affected the district. The data gathered 153 
and reported in this article were collected using participatory learning and action (PLA) tools 154 
and semi-structured interviews with key informants. PLA tools included generating actor 155 
maps, undertaking transect walks and focus group discussions (FGDs) (Mikkelsen 2005 p.63). 156 
Separate FGDs were held with women, men and children, and with elderly or disabled 157 
members, where appropriate and feasible. 43 group discussions were held in 10 sites.  An 158 
actor map was generated after these discussions, regarding the sources of information and 159 
networks that the respondents relied upon. 10 semi-structured interviews were held with 160 
adult females in the households and 36 interviews were conducted with key informants such 161 
as NGO staff, village leaders, panchayat (local government) officials, government officers, and 162 
schoolteachers. The first author conducted the interviews in Odia, the local language and 163 
recorded audio with permission from the respondents. She undertook manual transcription, 164 
coding and analysed the data reported here. She analysed interview data and field notes using 165 
mindmaps and a Framework approach (Gale et al., 2013). The Framework method is a 166 
systematic and flexible approach to analysing qualitative data, especially for inductive, 167 
thematic analysis of semi-structured interview transcripts, and involves rigour, reflexivity and 168 
ensures quality. Following this approach, the first author manually coded emerging themes, 169 
and then mapped relevant portions on roles, capacities and opportunities for local actors and 170 
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processes of gendered recovery and wrote up descriptions along these themes for inclusion 171 
in this paper. 172 
3.3 Ethics 173 
The study followed official (and necessary) procedures as per the Ethical guidelines at 174 
University College London and complied with the UK Data Protection Act 1998 ll. It adhered 175 
to ethical principles of informed consent and sensitivity in questioning people affected by 176 
disasters, and maintained their anonymity and privacy (Few et al. 2013 p.49). We took verbal 177 
consent from all the participants of focus groups and household interviews, and obtained 178 
written consent from key informants who agreed to participate in the study. No compensation 179 
was paid to any of the study participants. We recorded all names and kept these in a data 180 
protected sheet, while maintaining physical forms in secure storage. Only the first author had 181 
access to both. This research was sensitive to the ethical issues of working in a disaster 182 
situation: efforts were taken that their participation did not exacerbate their vulnerability or 183 
pose further difficulties. 184 
4. Findings  185 
Thematic analyses of qualitative data and interpretation of gaps in existing policies have been 186 
organised to understand the types and extent of local actors involved in post-disaster recovery 187 
in WASH, the opportunities and limitations of involving these actors and networks, and 188 
relevant policy implications.  189 
4.1 Study setting and context  190 
In India, there is strong focus on WASH and DRR sectors in existing government policies and 191 
schemes, such as Disaster Management Act (2005; revised 2016), National Rural Water 192 
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Drinking Programme, and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (2014) 1. 33% membership is reserved for 193 
women in formal institutions and government bodies related to water and sanitation  194 
(Routray et al., 2017). Odisha faces multiple hazards such as floods, cyclones and droughts, as 195 
well as poverty, unemployment, and low per capita income (Ray-Bennett, 2009a). It has the 196 
lowest level of household toilet access in India: an 84.7 per cent open defecation rate (MHA, 197 
2011 cited in Mommen and More, 2013). Between 1993 and 2011, toilet coverage in Odisha 198 
increased from 1.4 per cent to 14 per cent – an annual increase of around 0.7 per cent 199 
(Mommen and More, 2013).  200 
4.2 Role of local actors, institutions and other stakeholders 201 
The actor maps generated during the FGDs provided useful information about various forms 202 
of support received during disasters by the local actors. Table 1 presents a typology of actors 203 
involved post disasters in Puri and Balasore. 204 
 
1 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, re-launched in 2015 is a national flagship program which aims to 
completely eliminate open defecation in India by 2019 through construction of household toilets and 
emphasizing village cleanliness campaigns. 
 12 
Table 1: Type of actors involved in WASH and recovery in Puri and Balasore 205 
 206 
Local service providers: after the cyclone the local education and health service providers 207 
played a crucial role in hygiene behaviour changes at the community level. They formed an 208 
interface with humanitarian agencies including Oxfam and Action Aid, who were working in 209 
schools and health centres to promote awareness on hand washing, safe defecation practices 210 
and prevention and response measures for diarrhoea and other water-borne diseases. School 211 
teachers and government frontline workers such as Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA), 212 
Anganwadi workers and auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs), all locally hired female members, 213 
were part of community hygiene promotion campaigns. Oxfam incorporated the existing 214 
committee members from Village Water and Sanitation Committee into post-disaster village-215 
level WASH committees for construction of shared latrines and communal bathing units. For 216 
instance in Gopinathpur, Puri, the existing committee had received government training and 217 
funds prior to the disaster: 218 





Community health workers 
(ASHA, ANM) 
Village Water and Sanitation 
Committee members 
School/Anganwadi teacher 












Member of Legislative Assembly 
Government line 
departments 
Public Health Department & 
Public Health Engineering 
Department officials 
Odisha State Disaster 
Management Authority 











Self Help Group (SHG) members 
Youth groups 
Local businessmen and traders 
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“The members of the Village Water and Sanitation Committee play a key role in the 219 
implementation of the government sponsored sanitation development programmes 220 
[Swachh Bharat Abhiyan]. They participate in mason training, have access to funds for 221 
setting up a rural sanitation production centre that produces sanitary slabs and mats.” 222 
(KII, 2, 2013) 223 
Oxfam and local NGOs provided shared family latrines for immediate access in 6 villages. For 224 
provision of materials and construction of latrines, the local household members relied on 225 
local masons; and they relied on ward members for enlisting their names for awarding 226 
financial support as per the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan scheme as instalments for the latrines. 227 
Across coastal villages in Krushnaprasad block, school and Anganwadi teachers engaged with 228 
children on hygiene education programmes conducted by the NGOs in their village. There 229 
were sport activities, handwashing demonstrations, games and competitions for students to 230 
promote safe hygiene behaviour. 231 
 232 
Community based organisations and Local NGOs: After the 1999 Supercyclone, the civil 233 
society organisations had come together to form pre-disaster preparedness networks in both 234 
the districts consisting of local NGOs, community based organisations, women’s self-help 235 
groups and cooperatives. In Cyclone Phailin these networks were activated again. As soon as 236 
the media circulated warnings, Oxfam, along with its local partner NGOs – UNNAYAN in 237 
Balasore, United Artists Association (UAA) in Ganjam and Society for Leprosy Amelioration & 238 
Rehabilitation (SOLAR) in Puri – deployed rescue boats and mobilised contingency stocks from 239 
their warehouses, such as tarpaulin sheets and hygiene kits, in all three districts. Community-240 
based organisations led the mobilisation and search and rescue activities in the villages. An 241 
official from a local NGO reported, 242 
For us, community resilience can be achieved through community-based 243 
organisations, and groups, by strengthening their capacities, and encouraging them 244 
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to work closely with women [...] Livelihoods and improving productive assets is equally 245 
important during recovery. For this, organisations have to build new or strengthen 246 
existing community-market access (KII, 3, 2014) 247 
In Puri, Gopinath Juvak Sangh, a youth network, collaborated with SOLAR for community 248 
mobilization and activating a network of women’s groups for livelihood and cash-for-work 249 
projects in the affected villages and island villages in Chilikha lake. For hygiene promotion 250 
efforts, Oxfam and local NGOs mobilised youth facilitators at the community level to impart 251 
hygiene messages with the help of village rallies, slogans, and local language messages 252 
painted as murals on walls of latrines. In Balasore, Oxfam and its partner NGO UNNAYAN 253 
launched a response programme for 3 months. UNNAYAN had already mobilised women’s 254 
self-help groups (Mayurbhanj Mahila Association: MMA) and youth groups (Subarnarekha 255 
Suraksha Sena) which were functional even during 2007-2008 floods in the district. These 256 
community-based organisations (CBOs) were instrumental in ensuring displaced populations 257 
living in relief camps were provided with food packages and water supply. They also organised 258 
community kitchens in the relief camps for the flood-affected families. However, during the 259 
recovery phase the affected communities did not get any support from Oxfam or UNNAYAN 260 
as recovery efforts were focused on cyclone-affected villages. Oxfam and UNNAYAN engaged 261 
in advocacy for land allocation for erosion-affected households in Chadanamkhana village in 262 
Balasore, as government organisations had the mandate for provision of services and land 263 
allotments during the recovery phase.  264 
 265 
Local Government Officials: The Panchayat President, or Members of Legislative Assembly 266 
were higher up in the hierarchy of legislative powers to ensure households received 267 
compensation for household damage and repair. Panchayat members, revenue circle officers 268 
and Zilla Parishad 2 leaders played a crucial role in the aftermath of cyclone and floods, they 269 
 
2 District Council or Zilla Parishad or District Panchayat , is the third tier of the Panchayati Raj system 
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mobilised communities during the cyclone, disseminated early warning messages, evacuated 270 
them to the nearest cyclone- and flood-shelters, and organised emergency food and water 271 
supplies. They are also mandated with responsibilities as per the government schemes and 272 
policies. 273 
“Since Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan Programme (and recently Swach Bharat Abhiyan), 274 
sanitation is integrated under MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 275 
Employment Guarantee Scheme) and District Drinking Water Supply (DDWS) Scheme. 276 
The officials were involved in hygiene promotion activities providing Information, 277 
Education and Communication (IEC) materials and promoting use of latrines through 278 
construction of model toilets.” (KII, 2, 2014) 279 
Line department officers also played a crucial role in both districts. These departments and 280 
their roles in WASH and recovery are listed as follows: 281 
• Department of Water and Sanitation Mission: It is a society formed of various line 282 
departments who are in-charge of monitoring and evaluation of financial and 283 
physical performance of the water supply and sanitation services. They are 284 
responsible for convergence of the various departments as mandated by national 285 
policy. For WASH services, communities relied on Department of Water and 286 
Sanitation Mission (DWSM) for financial incentives to install hand pump and latrines 287 
at the household level. 288 
• Rural Development Department undertook water supply measures in rural Odisha; 289 
it houses the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSSS) to provide safe drinking 290 
water to all the coastal saline affected habitations and ensure piped water supply in 291 
villages  292 
• Public Health Engineering Department is the key government body implementing 293 
national and state-level water supply and sanitation schemes and programmes 294 
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• Odisha State Disaster Management Authority (OSDMA) played an active role 295 
during the rehabilitation by taking proactive measures in resource mobilisation, 296 
database management, and coordination with different departments and affected 297 
districts, donors and NGOs. 298 
• Revenue and Disaster Management Department (R&DM) is mainly involved with 299 
land entitlements and also provide relief compensation for households affected by 300 
natural calamities. It is in-charge of implementation of the Odisha Relief Code (ORC) 301 
during disasters (Government of Odisha 1996).  302 
Since the revamping of the sanitation programme, there has been a larger focus on promotion 303 
and construction of latrines, and village cleanliness programmes. Yet, it emerged that the 304 
component of disaster risk reduction is largely missing. Odisha Relief Code, the only existing 305 
disaster policy document for Odisha, explicitly mentions ‘sanitary arrangements’ just once in 306 
the context of restoration activities post-disasters.  307 
4.3 Local actors’ capacities and activities undertaken  308 
Table 2 characterises these localised efforts by listing the type of actors, their activities related 309 
to WASH and recovery and the challenges they faced in improving access and use of WASH 310 
systems during recovery. These are analysed to assess strengths and weakness of existing 311 
policies and schemes related to WASH and disaster recovery. 312 
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Table 2: Local actors, their activities in WASH and recovery and challenges faced 313 
No Categories Type Actors involved Activities relevant to WASH and recovery Challenges 
1 Local service 
providers  
 
Health  ASHA, ANM, 
traditional 
midwives  
- Involved by NGOs in recovery programming- 
WASH training and capacity building 
- Provision of chlorine tablets and preventive 
health 
- Limited human resources 









- Managing School WASH committees set up 
by the NGOs 
- Awards for best students in cleanliness 
awareness of handwashing, nail cutting 
- Schools act as first space for hygiene 
education 
- Limited resources in schools affected by disasters 
themselves 
- Primary focus is on education 















- Relief provision to displaced households 
- Damage assessment and compensation with 
the district administration  
- Allotment for schemes on housing, 
handpumps and latrines  
- Land allocation for erosion-affected 
households 
- Limited role and mandate for recovery solutions 
- Lack of coordination and guidelines for recovery for 
local govt officials 











- Damage assessment and allocation of 
subsidies for household latrine construction 
- Behaviour change communication for 
sanitation uptake and provision of safe water 
and safe water storage 
- Relief compensation to affected households 
- Hard-to-reach areas were overlooked in water 
supply and sanitation service delivery 
- Lack of convergence of activities between disaster-
related impacts on WASH and damage 
compensation 
- Incongruence between house damage and 
damaged to latrines or household hand pumps 
- Minimal coverage in the villages through piped 












Trained for supporting programme 
implementation  
- Relief distribution and Hygiene promotion, 
- Household surveys and monitoring  
- Construction and Facilitation skills 
- Limited role within programme 
- Lack of appropriate skills and knowledge of public 
health promotion or no prior experience of working 
in disaster affected areas 







- Training in DRR  
- Search and rescue, shelter management 
committees 
- Village task forces (TFs) 
- Limited funding and informal organised efforts in 













by government or 
Oxfam and village 
development 
- Committee generally comprises of local 
government representatives, schoolteacher, 
kindergarten (Anganwadi) worker, 
community health worker (Accredited Social 
Health Activist, ASHA), villager elders, Self-
help group members.  
- Mandated to identify beneficiaries, support 
latrine construction and responsible for 
operation and maintenance of latrines and 
communal handpumps 
- Attended training organised by Oxfam and 
received toolkits to repair and maintain 
handpump 
- In villages where government committees were not 
functional Oxfam facilitated development of new 
committees called Water and sanitation user 
groups 
- Require handholding and training for 
understanding technical aspects of operation and 
maintenance of WASH systems 
- Lack in technical understanding of repairing and 
maintenance of WASH systems 
- Potential for motivating and generating demand for 
latrine use was not exploited 
4 Local NGOs Development 
and DRR 
UNNAYAN, SOLAR 
and Gopinath Juvak 
Sangh 
- Prior experience of 1999 super cyclone  
- Humanitarian objectives and relief 
distribution 
- Partnerships and networks for response 
- Funding for longer-term recovery programmes 
- Expertise and mandate for WASH and resilience 
programming 
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Rural Development Department (RDD) organised 234 tankers, 345 mobile vans, 29 lakh water pouches 315 
and deployed generators to restart piped water supply in 18 affected districts through the Rural Water 316 
Supply and Sanitation (RWSS). RDD response included disinfection of 58,100 tubewells and 317 
distribution of 1,661 (25-kg) bags of bleaching powder. The financial costs included INR 122.34 lakh 318 
for emergency drinking water and additional INR 27.61 crores for repairing 3040 rural piped water 319 
systems and 1,62,170 damaged tubewells. Despite above measures, sanitation facilities were lacking 320 
in the cyclone shelters, and in the affected villages. There were gaps in outreach measures by the RDD 321 
as they had limited capacities in the face of multiple disasters. Self-employed mechanics (SEMs) were 322 
deployed for hand pump disinfection, but they could not access the remote, waterlogged and isolated 323 
villages. Similarly, mobile water tankers catered to the roadside villages and ignored the farthest 324 
hamlets and island villages. During a RDD meeting for INGO coordination in WASH support, it emerged 325 
that subsequent rains and floods had stretched the Department’s limited resources, and greater 326 
flexibility was needed in the humanitarian WASH response for the changing conditions and the local 327 
context. RDD officials encouraged NGOs to undertake disinfection of water sources, water treatment, 328 
storage and testing, (re)construction of water sources and raised platforms, hygiene promotion 329 
among communities and schools, assessments and trainings. 246 Issues pertaining to WASH response 330 
raised during the meeting were:  331 
• Disinfection of water sources: It was decided that INGOs should focus on disinfection of 332 
private water sources and wells, while RDD disinfected the government-installed tubewells. 333 
All sources, including ponds, should be disinfected, but messages should be given to avoid 334 
drinking pond water. 335 
• Household versus community-level focus: RDD encouraged NGOs to focus on households 336 
while government could focus on the community level for hygiene promotion. 337 
• Sanitation options: The prevalent open defecation practice, near water sources, was 338 
recognised as a major health threat; there was a need for stronger evidence for the suitability 339 
and appropriateness of trench toilets in the context of Odisha. During the meeting, RDD 340 
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encouraged sharing of experiences by agencies on trench toilets and sanitation promotion 341 
approaches to continue beyond the emergencies. 342 
• Tankers, pumps and treatment units: RDD welcomed the deployment of tankers, generators/ 343 
solar pumps by INGOs to support supply, treatment and distribution of water.  344 
The World Bank funded and supported a $1.45 billion programme in the cyclone-affected districts 345 
of Ganjam, Puri and Khorda for building disaster resilient houses, improving slums and city 346 
infrastructure, and strengthening disaster risk management capacities. Additionally, $313 million 347 
funds were pledged by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank: $55 million for 348 
construction of 162 cyclone shelters, $152 million for reconstruction of damaged households 349 
within a 5 km radius of the coastline, and slum redevelopment. These proposals did not factor 350 
WaSH interventions into the resettlement plans.  351 
Table 3 summarises following policies and schemes in WASH and recovery for understanding critical 352 
gaps in implementation. 353 
- Water supply schemes: National Rural Drinking water programme 354 
- Sanitation schemes: Total Sanitation Campaign 355 
- Disaster Management Policy (2009) and Act (GoI, 2005) and state plans and relief manuals 356 
(Revenue Department 1976; Government of Odisha 1996; OSDMA 2013) 357 
 358 
The Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, Government of India oversees national programmes 359 
such as the Total Sanitation Campaign (which includes Nirmal Gram Puraskar, later renamed as Nirmal 360 
Bharat Abhiyan, and addressed as Swachh Bharat Abhiyan since October 2014) and National Rural 361 
Drinking Water Programme for ensuring safe drinking water and sanitation. In Odisha, this is under 362 
the mandate of Rural Development Department. 363 
 364 
4.4 Opportunities for strengthening local action 365 
 366 
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 Having described the roles and activities undertaken by various actors in localised disaster recovery, 367 
the following table enlists the gaps and opportunities for improving local action.368 
 22 
Table 3: Gap Analysis of WASH and disaster management policies in Odisha and India (Source: Author) 369 
Policy/ Scheme Institutional and funding features Challenges  
National Rural Drinking 
water programme  
* National Implementer: 
Ministry of Drinking 
Water and sanitation 
(MDWS)  
* State bodies: 
Water supply and support 
organisation (WSSO) & 
Department of Rural 
Development, Odisha. 
• Funds are under-utilised and only 52.28 % habitations are fully covered, 
47.71% are partially covered and only 2.27% PWSS are reported to be 
managed by the rural population.  
• Decentralised and Public-private partnership between Gram Panchayat 
and PHED;  
• Shift the focus from handpumps to PWSS, focuses on avoiding reliance on 
single water sources, which can be contaminated during natural 
calamities, and promotes integrated use of traditional systems  
• Convergence with TSC and MGNREGA for ponds construction, drainage, 
latrines 
• ASHA Workers shall be paid an incentive of INR 75 per water supply 
connection.  
1. Only 2% for natural calamities with 100% allocations 
by the central government as per policy, which limits 
the funds available from the state to address rural 
drinking water after disasters. 
2. Policy emphasises water security but lags in 
implementation; knowledge generation is top-down.  
3. Gender-blind policy approach: Nominal 
representation of women at village-level committees 
or those who are trained and employed as 
mechanics 
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Swachh Bharat Mission  
 
(SBA/SBM) Clean India 
Mission, 2014  
* National Implementers: 
MDWS with two Sub-
Missions, the Swachh 
Bharat Mission (Gramin) 
and the Swachh Bharat 
Mission (Urban)  
* State bodies: 




• National flagship programme to provide access to individual household 
latrines (IHHL) to all rural households, schools, anganwadis and public 
institutions 
• Yearly list of beneficiaries is generated, finalised through verification, and 
approved by Gram Sabha and Panchayat Samiti for eventual approval by 
Zilla Parishad for IHHLs 
• For subsequent years it shall be placed to Gram Sabha in usual manner 
during preparation of labour budget of total MGNREGS works. 
• Convergence with MGNREGS with INR 4,500/- for labour, INR 4600/- NBA, 
beneficiary contribution of INR 900/- for SC/ST, small marginal farmers, 
landless labourers physically handicapped women-headed families 
1. Annual beneficiary identification, subsidies 
provision, convergence with MGNREGA, which has 
abysmal records of implementation in the state are 
deterrents in sanitation development.  
2. In the context of disaster recovery, the opportunity 
for advocating changes and generating demand for 
sanitation is missed.  
3. Lack of support for Households/habitations 
interested in constructing latrines post-disasters and 
lack of provision of latrines within the disaster 
shelters for children, elderly and disabled  
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Disaster Management 
Act (2005) and Policy 
(2009)  
* National Implementers: 
National Disaster 
Management Authority 
(NDMA) and   
National Institute of 
Disaster Management 
(NIDM) 
* State bodies & policy: 
(OSDMA)  
 
• Emphasises provision of drinking water supply, and recovery measures 
by line departments post-disasters, however completely missed 
sanitation 
• Policy refers to reconstruction to build disaster resilient structures and 
advocates for speedy, owner driven, linking with safe development and 
livelihood restoration 
• Odisha Relief Code (1996) 
• OSDMA is not the implementing authority, their main role is in 
coordination and overseeing disaster risk reduction and reconstruction 
programmes 
1. Erosion is not acknowledged as a natural disaster, 
hence affected families do not receive relief or 
rehabilitation support. 
2. Lack of emphasis on restoration of WASH facilities, 
sanitation is missed in relief manuals 
3. No provision for damage compensation for water and 
sanitation facilities 
4. Lack of guidelines for tackling open defecation in a 
post-disaster context, especially strategies for demand 




5. Discussion 371 
The findings indicate that WASH during recovery remains a critical gap in existing policies, schemes and 372 
programming strategies, and often ignores post-disaster sanitation and hygiene. Arguably, an opportunity 373 
available during recovery, to instil and sustain changes in WASH, is often missed by the agencies.  374 
a) Post disaster WASH is often relief-centric and ignores longer-term recovery: The government officials 375 
and line departments focused on short-term, relief-centric water supply, ignoring the longer-term 376 
recovery needs of the disaster-affected and displaced populations. The provision of water supply and 377 
food provisioning was limited to the relief camps and accessible villages. It was observed that the affected 378 
populations living in the relief camps, multi-purpose shelters, and villages had inadequate water sources 379 
and sanitation facilities during recovery. The government measures did not reach out to the remote 380 
villages, which were worst hit by floods and cyclones, where the most vulnerable groups had limited 381 
access to WASH facilities. The PHED restored piped water supply schemes (PWSS) and disinfected spot 382 
sources (handpumps and tubewells) along the roads, and townships but the rural areas did not have 383 
PWSS, and remained under-served. The hygiene promotion efforts by government were limited in the 384 
post-disaster context, they did not concern with uptake of latrine use, health risks associated with unsafe 385 
practices in water handling and open defecation. These challenged the effectiveness and impact of 386 
hygiene promotion efforts carried out by NGOs, as a result hygiene behavioural changes were difficult to 387 
sustain without committed longer-term efforts in addressing the attitudinal changes by the government 388 
post-disasters. 389 
b) Existing policies lack focus on WASH during recovery: the Disaster Management Act (2005), and the 390 
Amendment Bill (2016) have paid little attention to issues related to WASH during recovery and these 391 
issues are not supported through other policies and guidelines. Sanitation provision during response is 392 
not mentioned in the outdated Odisha relief code manual, and did not feature in the OSDMA 393 
reconstruction programme funded by World Bank. The State relief codes and manuals were found to be 394 
inadequate as a guiding document for Government relief: the provisions in the codes lay down the 395 
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process to be established before, during and after a disaster, and assign duties but leave it open for the 396 
District administration on the specifics of how to perform those duties, to protect the basic rights and 397 
entitlements of the affected population. The line departments follow the Odisha Relief Code, 1980 398 
(updated in 1996), which is an out-dated relief manual for post-disaster action, and does not reflect the 399 
complexities of recurring, ‘localised’ and multiple disasters or provide clear, adequate emphasis on 400 
recovery of WASH and related systems for longer-term, as reflected in other studies undertaken in 401 
Odisha (Ray-Bennett, 2009a).  When the line departments initiated immediate water provisioning 402 
measures and convened the NGO coordination meetings they chose to not take action on prevalent open 403 
defecation practices in the region. Sanitation was not included in preparedness measures, as all the 404 
measures constituted by OSDMA and RDD focused on raised handpumps, stockpiling of water 405 
purification tablets, and purchase of water treatment units only. The affected households did not receive 406 
any financial support as they bore the cost of raising platforms for hand pumps and were not provided 407 
with any technical assistance for operation and maintenance of newly installed water facilities.  408 
c) Lack of attention to local actors and women  in WASH during recovery:  The local actors, service providers, 409 
and Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) implementing the schemes had limited capacities, resources and 410 
power. In order to sustain behavioural changes post-disasters, the involvement of community leaders 411 
needs to be systematised in hygiene promotion efforts. The PRIs have limited resources to allocate 412 
annual subsidies for post-disaster toilet construction and hand pump installation. There is potential to 413 
involve the health and education service providers in hygiene education through outreach programmes. 414 
However, their existing responsibilities in sector-specific roles do not encourage them to undertake 415 
hygiene education activities during recovery. Furthermore, the existing village water sanitation and 416 
hygiene committees can be systematically involved in post-disaster WASH programmes, in decision-417 
making and strengthening linkages between response and recovery actions and development 418 
programmes. There is also potential to enhance livelihood opportunities along with sanitation 419 
improvement in rural areas, which could be explored during recovery phase. Consequently, this study 420 
underscores the importance of training and technical expertise to strengthen the community capacities 421 
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through local institutions and institution-building (Manyena, 2009). By this we do not mean conducting 422 
training as events, but looking at these as part of a larger process of capacity development, by which 423 
people, organisations and societies strengthen and sustain their abilities to take effective decisions and 424 
actions to reduce disaster risk’ (Scott & Few, 2016). Women faced privacy and security issues due to lack 425 
of latrines, difficulties during open defecation and water collection, and problems in attending to 426 
menstrual hygiene needs during disasters. The manuals, policies and programmes do not incorporate 427 
women’s needs and challenges faced during disasters, and are blind to gender sensitivities during relief 428 
distribution. There are no separate WaSH facilities for women, or privacy in the relief camps and cyclone 429 
shelters. Gender aspects in WASH during recovery were overlooked by the government actions, an 430 
aspect noted in other research (Krishnan & Twigg, 2016; Krishnan et al., 2015; O’Reilly, 2010; Sommer, 431 
2012).  432 
d) Policies in WASH and disaster risk reduction fail to consider multi-hazard perspective: The WASH 433 
preparedness measures lacked a multi-hazard perspective, as different disasters had different impacts 434 
on WASH facilities – cyclones caused structural damages to the water facilities during storm surge while 435 
floods caused submergence and inundation resulting in groundwater contamination and erosion caused 436 
WASH facilities to be washed away. Although OSDMA was lauded for its coordination efforts with local 437 
and international NGOs and multinational organisations during disasters, for implementing disaster 438 
preparedness and mitigation measures, recovery and reconstruction from multiple disasters was missing 439 
from the recent policy shift from a reactive response to proactive prevention approach in the Disaster 440 
Management Act of 2005 and the Policy, 2009. These do not consider erosion as a natural disaster, 441 
thereby preventing the government and NGOs from providing relief and rehabilitation support to 442 
erosion-affected households in Odisha.  443 
e) Local action and measures for WASH during recovery are fragmented and siloed: Local actors and 444 
community-based organisations such as youth networks and women’s self-help groups play crucial role 445 
in search and rescue, evacuation, community mobilization, early warning dissemination and emergency 446 
food and water provisioning during the cyclone. Local actors are themselves affected by cyclone, yet as 447 
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seen in Balasore they can champion themselves collectively and organise community kitchens for 448 
providing cooked food to flood-affected populations living in camps. Thus, community-based 449 
organisations (CBOs) were instrumental in ensuring displaced populations living in relief camps were 450 
provided with food packages and water supply. However, these sporadic efforts fall short due to lack of 451 
resources for income generation activities to address emerging livelihood needs during recovery. 452 
Different line depts - DWSM, RDD, PHED, OSDMA and R&DM are responsible for related aspects in WASH 453 
and recovery. This division of disaster management functions in the government, for relief coordination 454 
and undertaking recovery, results in a fragmented approach. For instance, OSDMA focused on 455 
preparedness and coordination during disasters, while the Revenue and Disaster Management 456 
Department focus on recovery and rehabilitation. Although OSDMA coordinated reconstruction planning 457 
and implementation it was limited in its focus and mandate for WASH, and acquisition of safer land for 458 
reconstruction which was looked after by the R&DM department.   459 
Our study had strengths and limitations. Our empirical research from two districts in Odisha provides 460 
indicative guidance on why it is important to focus on WASH during recovery from a multi-hazard perspective. 461 
It provides insights from the ground on how local capacities and strengths can be utilized to formulate a 462 
cohesive action for WASH post-disasters and what challenges they face. It adds to the growing bodies of 463 
literature on disaster recovery, that largely focuses on shelter, and on WASH during recovery. It also provides 464 
an understanding of how programmes and policies can be designed and implemented in an inclusive, and 465 
participatory manner. There were some limitations in the study as well. In FGDs, group dynamics could have 466 
influenced responses as participation was not uniform and some members were more vocal than others. 467 
Since it is informed by a case study approach, generalising findings to other settings should be done 468 
cautiously. The conclusions drawn from the empirical research, especially regarding role of state disaster 469 
management bodies, inclusion of local actors and women in disaster recovery planning is relevant to other 470 
states in India, and can be useful to inform further research in low-middle income countries in Global South.  471 
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Conclusions 472 
This research argues that provision of WASH facilities during recovery is a critical gap, which requires policy 473 
attention. It is argued that there is a potential for strengthening local actors’ role in WASH during recovery 474 
through devolution of power and authority, and strengthening attention to incorporate women’s roles in 475 
WASH to reflect the dynamism of women’s capacities and needs during recovery. This will allow for WASH 476 
systems damaged by multiple disasters to be restored and improved for resilience to future disasters. Based 477 
on the findings some of the critical conclusions this paper offers are as follows: a) existing policies should 478 
emphasise immediate as well as longer-term WASH needs, and equally invest in learning and innovation in 479 
water, sanitation and hygiene behaviour changes. b) a multi-hazard perspective in preparedness, restoration 480 
and compensation for damages at the household level through the schemes will ensure households living in 481 
extreme poverty are supported in their recovery processes irrespective of the nature of the hazard – cyclone, 482 
flood or erosion; c) development WASH schemes, namely the National Rural Drinking Water Programme 483 
(NRWDP) and Total Sanitation Campaign, should consider WASH service provision to disaster-affected 484 
households by providing additional subsidies for construction of household latrines and water supply 485 
systems; d) existing manuals, policies and programmes should incorporate women’s needs and challenges 486 
faced during disasters, and be sensitive to women’s immediate as well as longer-term needs – for instance 487 
providing for safe spaces, latrines and bathing cubicles in the cyclone shelters. 488 
Thus, this paper calls for a new research agenda to address post-disaster recovery concerns through the 489 
capacities and importance of local actors and how they can bridge the gap between disaster relief and 490 
development objectives. 491 
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